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Abstract:  This paper examines how optimal prevention and control policies depend on 
the economic and biological characteristics of a randomly introduced biological invasion 
where the objective is to minimize the expected social costs from prevention, control, and 
invasion damages.  The results characterize how optimal prevention and control policies 
vary with the initial invasion size, the invasion growth rate, and the probability 
distribution of introductions.  The paper also examines the conditions under which the 
optimal policy relies solely on either prevention or control, the conditions under which it 
is optimal to completely prevent new introductions, and the conditions under which 
eradication of established invasions is optimal 
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  On Prevention and Control of an Uncertain Biological Invasion 
The invasion of ecological systems by non-indigenous species is a significant 
component of global environmental change (Vitousek et. al.) that imposes substantial 
economic and ecological damages.  In the United States alone, the number of harmful 
invasive species is in the thousands, approximately one-fourth of the value of the 
countryNs agricultural output is lost to non-indigenous plant pests or the costs of 
controlling them (Simberloff), and the total costs of non-indigenous species have been 
estimated to be as high as $137 billion per year (Pimentel, et. al.). 
Prevention and control are the two basic ways the costs of an invasive species can 
be reduced.  Approximately half of U.S. federal expenditures for invasive species are for 
prevention activities (National Invasive Species Council).  Control of an invasive species 
after it becomes established may involve significant control costs and pest damages.  For 
example, $5 billion are spent annually on herbicides (Keily, et.al.) while the value of 
annual crop losses to weeds has been estimated at $20 billion (in 1991 dollars)  (AHPIS 
PPD)  with roughly 50-75% of these costs attributed to nonindigenous weed species 
(OTA).  Prevention policy reduces the invasive species damages and the need for control, 
but prevention is costly, imperfect, and may restrict the flow of beneficial goods and 
services.  Given that prevention and control have different costs and that they target the 
damages from invasive species in different ways, a fundamental issue in invasive species 
management is the appropriate balance between prevention and control policy.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine how optimal prevention and control 
policies depend on the economic and biological characteristics of a randomly introduced 
biological invasion where the objective is to minimize the expected social costs from 
prevention, control, and invasion damages.
2  At the time prevention and control decisions 
are made the planner knows the size of the established invasion, y.  Depending on the 
context, the size of an invasion may be the area occupied by the invasive species, the 
population, or the biomass of the invasive species.  If no invasion currently exists then y 
= 0.  Control by chemical, biological, manual, or other means can be used to reduce the 
size of the existing invasion.  A reduced form is used where the reduction in the size of 
the invasion from all inputs is denoted by a.  The size of the invasion that exists after 
control is x = y-a.  
In general, control costs depend on both the amount controlled (the reduction in 
the size of the invasion) and on the size of the invasion being controlled.  In some cases 
the marginal costs of control vary more with the invasion size than they do with control.  
For example, historical attempts to eradicate invasive species indicate that it may cost as 
much to remove the last one to ten percent of an invasion as it does to control the initial 
ninety to ninety-nine percent (Myers, et. al.).  Control costs are denoted by C(a,y).  Both 
total and marginal costs of control are assumed to be increasing a and non-increasing in y. 
 The latter implies that it is less costly to reduce the size of a large invasion by a given 
amount than it is to reduce the size of a smaller invasion by the same amount.  Further, 
for a given amount of control, the last unit of control is less costly to achieve if the initial  
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invasion is large.  These are plausible assumptions when the inputs for control are used in 
a cost effective way. 
Invasive species introductions, ω, occur randomly according to a distribution 
F(ω,θ) with density f(ω,θ).  Introductions can be reduced through screening and 
prevention efforts, s.  Increases in s could represent more stringent treatment of wood 
packing materials to prevent the spread of wood boring pests, or more stringent screening 
of livestock imports for disease.  Prevention is scaled so that it achieves a proportional 
reduction in the random invasive species introduction.  A value of s equal to zero is 
associated with no prevention, while a value of s equal to one is associated with a 
prevention level high enough to eliminate new introductions.  The parameter θ is used to 
examine how shifts in the distribution of species introductions affects prevention and 
control policy.  The cost of prevention is H(s), where H is an increasing and convex 
function. 
The levels of prevention and control are both chosen before the random 
introduction is observed.  The invasion that exists after control grows at a rate α and the 
invasion size after the random introduction occurs is z = αx + (1-s)ω.  This causes 
damages D(z), which may be interpreted as the discounted lifetime social costs associated 
with the invasion size, z, that exists after current prevention and control decisions are 
made and new invasive species introductions are observed.  The damage function D(z) is 
increasing and convex.  
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The invasive species management problem is to choose the levels of prevention 
and control that minimize expected social costs.  Formally this problem can be expressed 
as: 
Min  C(a,y) + H(s) + ID(α(y-a)+(1-s)ω)f(ω,θ)dω 
a,s 
 
subject to: 0 # a # y, 0 # s # 1.  The three cost functions, C, H and D, are all assumed to 
be twice continuously differentiable.
3  The solutions to this problem will be optimal 
prevention and control policies, S(y,α,θ) and A(y,α,θ), that depend on the size of the 
existing invasion, the growth rate of the invasion after control, and the probability 
distribution of introductions.  Associated with the optimal control policy is an optimal 
post-control invasion size X(y,α,θ) = y - A(y,α,θ). 
Table 1 characterizes how the different possible outcomes for optimal prevention 
and control depend on marginal costs and damages.  When optimal prevention and 
control policies are interior they satisfy the first order conditions: 
Ca(a,y) = αE[Dz(α(y-a)+(1-s)ω)] 
Hs(s) = E[ωDz(α(y-a)+(1-s)ω)]. 
The optimal control balances the marginal costs of control against the expectation of 
random marginal damages associated with growth in the last unit of the invasion that 
remains after control.  Similarly, optimal prevention balances the marginal costs of 
prevention against the expectation of random marginal damages weighted by the scale of 
the random introduction.  
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The main purpose of this paper is to examine how optimal prevention and control 
policies vary with the initial invasion size, the invasion growth rate, and the probability 
distribution of introductions.  First, consider how the initial invasion size affects optimal 
prevention and control. 
Proposition 1.  a)  The optimal control is nondecreasing in the initial invasion size, i.e., 
MA(y,α,θ)/My $ 0.  b)  If marginal control costs are more sensitive to changes in control 
than to changes in the invasion size, Caa + Cay $ 0,  then the optimal post-control 
invasion size is larger and satisfies 1 $ MX(y,α,θ)/My $ 0.  In addition, MS(y,α,θ)/My $ 0 so 
that prevention increases with the initial invasion size.   c)  If marginal control costs are 
more sensitive to changes in the invasion size than to changes in control, Caa + Cay # 0, 
then the opposite is true for interior optimal policies.  If the optimal policy is interior 
then MX(y,α,θ)/My # 0 and MS(y,α,θ)/My # 0 so the optimal post-control invasion size is 
smaller and prevention is less when the initial invasion size is larger. 
The intuition behind these results is as follows.  An increase in the initial size of 
the established invasion reduces marginal control costs and increases expected marginal 
damages.  The optimal policy compensates for this by increasing control, thereby raising 
marginal control costs and reducing expected marginal damages.  This establishes part 
(a).  Now suppose the optimal control increases by more than the change in the size of the 
invasion.  This reduces the post-control invasion size and expected marginal damages.  
But when marginal control costs are more sensitive to control than to the size of the 
invasion, such a policy also increases the marginal costs of control.  This cannot be  
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optimal since it creates a wedge between expected marginal damages and the marginal 
costs of control.  As a consequence, control must increase less than the change in 
invasion size when Caa + Cay $ 0.  This establishes part (b).   A similar argument implies 
that control must increase by more than the change in the invasion size when Caa + Cay # 
0 and the optimal control is strictly positive.   
Parts (a) and (b) have obvious implications for policy.  The policy implications of 
part (c) are worth noting.  In an intertemporal setting they imply that when control costs 
are very sensitive to changes in the invasion size, periodic control may be an optimal 
policy and optimally managed invasions may follow cycles (Olson and Roy 2004).  In 
addition, because a larger invasion lowers the marginal cost of control, it is optimal to 
shift policy from prevention to control as the invasion size increases. 
Next, consider how differences in the invasion growth rate affect prevention and 
control. 
Proposition 2.  a)  The optimal control is non-decreasing in the initial growth rate.  b)  
The optimal post-control invasion size is non-increasing in the invasion growth rate.  c) 
The optimal prevention is non-decreasing in the invasion growth rate. 
The intuition and policy implications of these results is straight-forward.  Each 
unit of control yields a greater reduction in expected marginal damages when the invasion 
growth rate is higher.  As a consequence, the incentives for control increase with the 
invasion growth rate.  This, in turn, stimulates more prevention since the two polices act 
as substitutes to reduce damages.  
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Finally, let us consider how the probability distribution of introductions affects 
optimal policy for prevention and control.  Suppose that increases in θ are associated with 
a shift in the distribution that satisfies monotone likelihood ratio dominance (MLR).  
Formally, this equivalent to fθ/f increasing in ω.  MLR dominance implies first order 
stochastic dominance (-Fθ # 0), so intuitively, the probability that invasive species 
introductions are greater than any given threshold increases as θ increases.  MLR 
dominance also has the stronger implication that, for all possible introductions, the 
likelihood of a larger introduction increases more than the likelihood of a smaller 
introduction.  In a portfolio choice model with a single risky asset, Milgrom shows that 
MLR dominance always increases the demand for a risky asset.  For more general 
univariate choice problems, Ormiston and Schlee demonstrate that MLR shifts in 
distribution have the same effect on optimal choices as an increase in risk aversion. 
The invasive species management problem of this paper has the characteristic that 
species introductions are like a risky asset, but with two policy instruments the 
conclusions drawn from a simple portfolio choice problem may be affected by 
interactions between policies.  The marginal benefit from an increase in control depends 
only on the expectation of random marginal damages (weighted by the growth rate), 
while the marginal benefit from an increase in prevention depends on the expectation of 
random marginal damages, the expected introduction rate and the covariance between 
introductions and damages.  To gain a better understanding of how these interactions 
between uncertainty, prevention and control affect policy it is useful to compare the  
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results to two cases.  The first is the response of prevention and control to a deterministic 
increase in the introduction rate. 
Proposition 3.  Assume the introduction ω is deterministic.  Then MS/Mω $ 0.  Further, if 
Hss(1-s)/Hs $ 1 then MA/Mω  $ 0. 
The second case for comparison is the response of one policy to a shift in the distribution 
when the other policy is held fixed. 
Proposition 4.  a)  If control is fixed then MS/Mθ $ 0.  b)  If prevention is fixed then MA/Mθ 
$ 0. 
This result subsumes the special case where the introduction of invasive species is 
deterministic and only one policy is available. 
When policy includes both prevention and control the planner's attitudes toward 
risk play an important role in determining the response of policy to changes in the 
distribution of introductions. 
Proposition 5.  a)  If Dzz/Dz is decreasing in z then MS/Mθ $ 0.  b)  If ωDzz/Dz is 
decreasing in ω then MA/Mθ $ 0. 
Prevention policy is strengthened in response to an MLR shift in the distribution 
of introductions when absolute aversion to risk is increasing, where risk aversion is 
interpreted in the normal utility-theoretic sense and utility is the negative of damages.  An 
increase in the likelihood of a larger introductions leads to an increase in the absolute 
amount of prevention.  When the elasticity of marginal damage with respect to new  
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introductions is decreasing, marginal damages become less sensitive to introductions as θ 
increases.  This causes policy to shift toward greater control. 
To conclude, we offer some observations on the effect of an increase in risk or the 
variability of the distribution of introductions as measured by second order stochastic 
dominance.  For example, one can think of an increase in risk as a mean preserving 
spread in the distribution.  Suppose that marginal damages are convex.  For given levels 
of prevention and control, an increase in the variability of introductions increases the 
marginal benefits from prevention and control. This, in turn, implies that emphasis on at 
least one of the policies increases in response to greater uncertainty.  If the marginal 
damage function is concave, the opposite is true under certain additional restrictions.  If 
marginal damages are constant then the economic benefits from prevention and control 
depend only on the expected introduction rate. The broad conclusion is that the curvature 
of the marginal damage function plays an important role in determining the qualitative 
effects of changes in the variability of invasive species introductions.  This means that 
decision makers need to be informed about the curvature of the marginal damage function 
(the third derivative of the damage function) in order to evaluate how increases in risk 
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Table 1 - Sufficient conditions for various policy outcomes 
 
s  a 
 
No control, a=0 
 
Positive control, 0<a<y 
 























Ca(0,y) > αEDz(αy+ω) 
Hs(0) > EωDz(αy+ω) 
 
Ca(0,y) < αEDz(αy+ω) 
Ca(y,y) > αEDz(ω) 
Hs(0) > EωDz(α(y-a)+ω) 
 
Ca(y,y) < αEDz(αy+ω) 






























Ca(0,y) > αEDz(αy+(1-s)ω) 
Hs(0) < EωDz(αy+ω) 
Hs(1) > Dz(αy)Eω 
 
Ca(0,y) < αDz(αy), Ca(y,y) > αEDz(ω) 
Hs(0) < EωDz(ω), Hs(1) > Dz(αy)Eω 
 
Ca(y,y) < αEDz(αy+(1-s)ω) 
Hs(0) < EωDz(ω) 




























Ca(0,y) > αDz(αy) 
Hs(1) < Dz(αy)Eω 
 
Ca(0,y) < αDz(αy) 
Ca(y,y) > αDz(0) 
Hs(1) < Dz(α(y-a))Eω 
 
Ca(y,y) < αDz(0) 
Hs(1) < Dz(0)Eω  
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1.  Agricultural economists have long been concerned about problems of pest management.  The early 
literature is reviewed by Shoemaker.  It focuses on issues such as pesticide resistance and intra-
seasonal management.  The more recent literature on the economics of invasive species examines other 
important aspects of the problem (see the references in Olson and Roy (2002). 
2.  Proofs of all propositions are omitted due to space limitations. 
3.  Subscripts are used to denote partial derivatives as in Ca(a,y) = MC(a,y)/Ma and Cay(a,y) = 
M
2C(a,y)/MaMy. 